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Abstract 
In Arun the Constitutional Court held that section 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 
(LUPO) vests all land indicated as public roads on a development plan in the local authority 
upon approval of such a plan. This includes land that is in excess of the normal need of the 
development. The appellant must hence be compensated for the "expropriation" of such 
excess land if the provision is to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution. This ruling is 
problematic for both expropriation law and administrative law.  
In terms of section 25(2) four objections may be raised against the Arun decision. Firstly, it 
disregards the function of the public interest requirement for expropriation, as understood in 
view of the law-of-general-application requirement (which, in turn, is informed by the legality 
principle). The state cannot expropriate property for purposes that are ultra vires (or ulterior to) 
the authorising legislation. Yet the Arun court seems to allow just this by permitting the local 
authority to acquire land unrelated to the normal need of the development against payment of 
compensation instead of setting the attempted expropriation aside. The judgment, secondly, 
ignores the role of compensation under section 25(2). Merely paying compensation to an 
affected party cannot turn an invalid expropriation into a valid one, since compensation is 
merely the result of a valid expropriation and not a justification for it. Thirdly, it makes the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation pivot on the effect of the property limitation, 
which is unable to properly distinguish between these two forms of limitation in all instances. 
Finally, Moseneke DCJ's ruling seems to afford an election to litigants who are affected by 
materially defective expropriations to choose whether to accept the expropriation and claim 
compensation or to have it reviewed and set aside under PAJA. This election, if it indeed 
exists, subverts the principles of expropriation law and may have negative repercussions for 
both expropriation law and administrative law, especially in view of the single-system-of-law 
principle.  
From an administrative law perspective the authors identify four considerations that could 
assist courts in determining whether administrative law should be considered, if not applied, in 
a given case. The first is the internal coherency of the law in view of the subsidiarity principles. 
The subsidiarity principles provide guidelines for courts to decide cases where two 
fundamental rights might be applicable. A principled approach is necessary in this context to 
ensure that the law operates as a single system and displays the positive characteristics of 
such a system. The fact that Moseneke DCJ preferred to award compensation to Arun instead 
of reviewing the expropriation under PAJA runs contrary to these principles and seems to 
result in an outcome which endorses – instead of prevents – administrative injustice. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court's refusal to follow PAJA by reason of its being onerous on 
the appellant contradicts earlier case law where the Court held that time-periods under the Act 
cannot be circumvented by reason of their being burdensome. The rationale behind these 
time-periods is integral to securing administrative justice, since time-periods are not merely 
formalistic technicalities. Thirdly, the authors argue that a green-light approach to internal 
remedies could have resulted in the broadening of the interpretative context and recognition of 
the legitimate role of the public administration in the state. Finally, deference as understood by 
Dyzenhaus also exemplifies why administrative law should not be ignored in cases which 
concern the exercise of public power. According to Dyzenhaus, deference requires courts to 
actively participate in the justification of administrative decisions by asking whether the 
administration's "reasoning did in fact and also could in principle justify the conclusion 
reached". 
Keywords 
Section 33; administrative law; lawfulness; legality principle; subsidiarity principles; 
expropriation; deprivation; section 25; property clause; constitutional property law; Arun case. 
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1 Introduction 
In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City1 (Arun) the 
Constitutional Court held that the vesting of excess land under section 28 
of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (C) (LUPO; the 
Ordinance) results in an expropriation which must be compensated if the 
provision is to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). This finding raises a number of 
questions for both expropriation law and administrative law. Our article 
therefore investigates this judgment from these two perspectives, more 
specifically section 25(2) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (PAJA).  
In terms of section 25(2) the decision, firstly, misconstrues the role of the 
public purpose and public interest requirements (hereafter referred to as 
the public interest requirement) in view of the law-of-general-application 
requirement, as informed by the legality principle. Secondly, it disregards 
the function of compensation for expropriation. It also places too much 
emphasis on the effect of the property limitation to properly distinguish 
between deprivation and expropriation. Finally, it seems to afford litigants 
affected by materially defective expropriations an election whether to 
challenge the attempted expropriation under PAJA – so as to set it aside – 
or to simply accept the expropriation by claiming compensation. Such an 
election undermines the principles of expropriation law and has negative 
repercussions for both administrative law and the single-system-of-law 
principle2 laid down in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
                                            
  Ernst Jacobus Marais. BA LLB LLD (Stellenbosch University). Senior lecturer, 
Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg. E-mail: 
ejmarais@uj.ac.za.  
  Petrus Jacobus Hermanus Maree. BA LLB LLD (Stellenbosch University). Post-
doctoral research fellow, Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University. E-mail: 
mareepjh@gmail.com. This article is based on two papers that were delivered at 
respectively the Arun day seminar, co-hosted by the University of Johannesburg and 
the South African Research Chair in Property Law and held at the Constitutional 
Court auditorium on 17 July 2015, and the South African Property Law Teachers 
Colloquium, hosted by and held at the Law Faculty at the Potchefstroom Campus of 
North-West University on 5-6 November 2015. We would like to thank Prof Geo 
Quinot, Dr Elsabé van der Sijde and Mr Björn Hoops, who read and commented on 
earlier drafts of this article. Their comments greatly helped to refine our arguments. 
Thanks also go to Prof André van der Walt and Mr Björn Hoops for sharing draft 
copies of their publications with us. Any remaining errors are our own. 
1  2015 2 SA 584 (CC). 
2  This term belongs to Van der Walt Property and Constitution 16. 
EJ MARAIS & PJH MAREE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)   3 
 
Africa: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa3 
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturers). Besides these objections it is 
questionable whether Arun should have been decided in terms of section 
25(2) at all. We argue that the attempted expropriation under section 28 
occurred by way of administrative action, which means it has to comply 
with the requirements for administrative justice under PAJA. 
For an administrative law point of view we focus on four considerations 
that indicate the importance of PAJA to cases like Arun. First, we attend to 
the internal coherency of the law in view of the subsidiarity principles. In 
this context we address the phenomenon of litigants choosing the remedy 
which best suits their interests in situations where two fundamental rights 
apply to the same set of facts. Hereafter we concentrate on the nature and 
principles of administrative law, which underscore the relevance of this 
legal field in situations when the state exercises public powers or public 
functions. Our focus then shifts to a green-light reading of internal 
remedies and respect as deference. The former indicates that litigants 
ought to first exhaust any internal remedies available to them before 
attempting to review a decision under PAJA, while the latter expands the 
range of reasons that justify state action and which courts may take into 
consideration when ascertaining the validity of those actions. 
To contextualise the discussion, section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
factual background and reasoning of the Constitutional Court in Arun. 
Section 3 then sets out the objections to the judgment from a section 25(2) 
perspective. The next section (section 4), in turn, identifies the difficulties 
under administrative law and indicates the relevance of PAJA to cases 
such as the present. Finally, section 5 presents a summary of our 
arguments and the conclusion. 
2 Factual background and the Constitutional Court's 
judgment4 
Arun Property Development (Arun; the appellant) wished to undertake 
residential development on land it owned in the Western Cape. It therefore 
submitted an application to the City of Cape Town (the local authority; the 
city) to obtain the necessary permission to subdivide its land. The city 
informed Arun that it would approve the subdivision application only if 
                                            
3  2000 2 SA 674 (CC). 
4  For a discussion of the Arun case from a planning law perspective, see Van Wyk 
2016 PELJ. 
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Arun's development plan provided for overly broad roads that would run 
over its land, since this would aid in the construction of future higher-order 
roads planned for the region as a whole.5 These roads would then vest in 
the city, since section 28 of LUPO6 provides that ownership of all land 
indicated as public streets on a development plan vests in the local 
authority upon approval of the plan, if the provision of the said public 
streets is necessary for the normal need of the development. The 
appellant made provision for these overly broad roads on its development 
plan and the local authority subsequently granted it permission (under 
section 25 of LUPO) to subdivide the land.  
The appellant thereupon instituted legal proceedings on the basis that it is 
entitled to compensation under section 28 for any land that vested in the 
city and which is unrelated to the normal need of the development 
(hereafter referred to as the excess land). The Constitutional Court, in a 
unanimous judgment, interpreted section 28 as vesting all land, including 
excess land, indicated as public roads on the development plan in the 
local authority upon confirmation of the subdivision.7 Against this backdrop 
the Court ruled that the local authority must compensate Arun for the 
expropriation of excess land if the provision is to comply with section 25(2) 
of the Constitution.8 
Moseneke DCJ relied mainly on three considerations to categorise the 
vesting as expropriation. He assumed, without deciding, that expropriation 
occurs through state coercion and without the consent of the affected 
party – both of which were satisfied on the facts.9 It was also found that 
                                            
5  Both Arun and the local authority assumed, without the local authority's conceding, 
that certain portions of land indicated as roads on the development plan were in 
excess of the normal need of the development: see Arun (CC) para 15.  
6  "Ownership, on subdivision, of public streets and public places. — The ownership of 
all public streets and public places over or on land indicated as such at the granting 
of an application for subdivision under section 25 shall, after the confirmation of such 
subdivision or part thereof, vest in the local authority in whose area of jurisdiction 
that land is situated, without compensation by the local authority concerned if the 
provision of the said public streets and public places is based on the normal need 
therefor arising from the said subdivision or is in accordance with a policy 
determined by the Administrator from time to time, regard being had to such need."  
7  Marais 2016 SALJ argues that this extensive interpretation of s 28 of LUPO is 
unjustified when regard is had to relevant contextual factors, which the Court seems 
to have ignored. For a contrary view, see Van Wyk 2016 PELJ 17. 
8  The vesting of land indicated as public roads which is required for the normal need 
of the development need not be compensated: see Arun (CC) paras 35, 40. 
9  Moseneke DCJ in Arun (CC) para 58 relied on Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 344 to make this finding, where the author states that "expropriation is brought 
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the vesting of excess land in the local authority without compensation is 
unrelated to the purpose of section 28.10 For this reason Arun had to 
receive compensation under section 26(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975 (the Expropriation Act) for the expropriation of the excess land if the 
provision was to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution.  
The city argued that Arun cannot claim compensation for an expropriation 
before it has exhausted its internal remedies under LUPO or, alternatively, 
that it should have had the decision that resulted in the expropriation 
reviewed under PAJA so as to have it set aside. Moseneke DCJ rejected 
these arguments for two reasons. He reasoned that it would be onerous to 
expect the appellant to follow the administrative law route. Secondly, he 
did not see why "Arun should be obliged to follow a process to set aside 
an administrative decision, whose lawfulness it has accepted and 
implemented".11 
The next section investigates the requirements for a valid expropriation 
and argues that the purpose behind the expropriation of the excess land is 
one which is not sanctioned by section 28 of the Ordinance. The section 
examines the status of expropriations that do not comply with one or more 
of the section 25(2) requirements and then identifies the method of 
expropriation at hand. In view of this analysis it appears that Moseneke 
DCJ treated the expropriation in Arun as an invalid (and thus defective) 
expropriation which may nevertheless be upheld at the insistence of the 
affected party, as long as it serves some conceivable public purpose or 
public interest, even one not sanctioned by the authorising statute. Against 
this backdrop section 4 focuses on the administrative law perspective of 
the case and argues that PAJA should have played a more prominent role 
in the Court's decision. 
3 The expropriation question 
3.1 Section 25(2) requirements 
Before examining the requirements for expropriation under section 25(2), it 
is necessary at the outset to attend to three characteristics common to 
most expropriations in order to clarify their role in our expropriation law, 
                                                                                                                       
about unilaterally by state action, without the cooperation (and often against the will) 
of the affected owner." 
10  Arun (CC) para 40. 
11  Arun (CC) para 70. 
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especially since two of them featured in Moseneke DCJ's judgment.12 The 
first is that expropriation is generally a process whereby a property holder 
is deprived of property, which then vests in the state.13 Although section 
25(2) does not explicitly set state acquisition as a requirement for 
expropriation, the Constitutional Court decided in Agri South Africa v 
Minister for Minerals and Energy14 (Agri SA) that the state must acquire 
property for there to be expropriation.15 Absent such acquisition, the 
property limitation16 can at most amount to a deprivation of property. The 
second and third features are that expropriation occurs through state 
                                            
12  Arun (CC) para 58. These two characteristics are discussed in the next paragraph 
below. 
13  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 31-32; Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of 
Agriculture 1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972; Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 
(A) 258; Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515. Also 
see Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 1; Badenhorst, Pienaar and 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 102, 541, 563; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 61; 
Van der Merwe Sakereg 291. 
14  2013 4 SA 1 (CC). 
15  Agri SA paras 58-59, citing Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 31-32 and 
Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 63. What is acquired by the state 
must bear "substantial similarity" or "sufficient congruence" with the property lost by 
the affected property holder: see Agri SA para 58. The debate whether state 
acquisition is now an indispensable requirement for expropriation will be settled by 
the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015 once it is signed into law, as it defines 
"expropriation" as "the compulsory acquisition of property by an expropriating 
authority or an organ of state upon request to an expropriating authority". For 
problems with viewing state acquisition as a "key" requirement for expropriation, see 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 194-200; Marais 2015 PELJ (Part I); 
Marais 2015 PELJ (Part II). Compare the minority opinions of Cameron J and 
Froneman J in Agri SA, who are hesitant to recognise state acquisition as the 
defining characteristic of expropriation. 
16  We deliberately do not use the terms "interference" and "infringement" to refer to the 
regulation of property by way of deprivation or, more broadly, expropriation. This is 
because these terms create the impression that property is an absolute, unrestricted 
right and that its regulation is therefore exceptional and temporary. Instead, by 
relying on Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship Between Property and 
Regulation 147-152, we use the term "limitation" to describe the impact of 
deprivation and expropriation on property, since these forms of regulation should be 
seen as inherent to the system of which property forms part. The view that property 
is a pre-constitutional, unregulated right that can be limited only under exceptional 
circumstances is incompatible with the single-system-of-law principle laid down in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: see Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship 
between Property and Regulation 150-151. A theoretical discussion of how property 
should be construed is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion in this 
regard, see Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation ch 2. 
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coercion and (normally) without the cooperation of the affected property 
holder.17 
It is uncontroversial that the state acquires property in the majority of 
expropriation cases and for this reason the acquisition requirement is 
helpful for distinguishing between deprivation and expropriation.18 
However, the mere fact that acquisition is now a key requirement of 
expropriation does not mean that every acquisition of property by the state 
is also an expropriation.19 Such an effect-centred analysis is overly 
simplistic, since the distinction between deprivation and expropriation does 
not hinge on the mere effect of the limitation.20 The same criticism may be 
raised against the two other features mentioned in the previous 
paragraph.21 This is because certain deprivations, such as taxation and 
criminal forfeiture, also exhibit these characteristics without amounting to 
expropriation.22 It follows that none of the three factors referred to are able 
to adequately categorise a property limitation as either deprivation or 
expropriation. To determine whether section 28 of LUPO truly results in a 
valid expropriation, it is necessary to analyse this provision in the context 
of the requirements for expropriation under section 25(2) of the 
Constitution. 
Section 25(2) stipulates that property may only be expropriated in terms of 
law of general application for a public purpose or in the public interest 
against payment of compensation.23 The rest of this section addresses 
each of these three requirements in turn. The "law" in this provision refers 
to statute law, since South African law does not recognise common-law 
expropriation.24 Expropriation is a public power that accrues only to the 
                                            
17  Arun (CC) para 58, approving Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 344. Also 
see Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258. See further 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 1. 
18  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 197, 345; Marais 2015 PELJ (Part II) 
3035-3037. 
19  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196-199, 315-319; Marais 2015 PELJ 
(Part II) 3035-3039. Also see Van der Walt 2014 ASSL; Slade 2016 PELJ 17-18. 
20  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196-199, 315-319; Marais 2015 PELJ 
(Part I) 3014-3022; Marais 2015 PELJ (Part II) 3035-3039. 
21  Arun (CC) paras 55, 58, approving Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 344. 
Also see Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258. See further 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 1. 
22  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196-199, 315-319; Marais 2015 PELJ 
(Part II) 3035-3039. 
23  Compare ss 2(1) and 2(3) of the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015. 
24  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 
3 (CC) para 63; Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 81; 
Groengras Eiendomme (Pyt) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002 1 SA 
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state.25 As a public power expropriation is subject to the principle of 
legality, which entails that the state may exercise powers and perform 
functions only in as far as they are conferred on it by law.26 The state may 
thus expropriate property only in terms of legislation that specifically 
authorises it to use this power.27 The empowering legislation must also set 
out the circumstances, procedures and conditions upon which 
expropriation may take place.28 
The legality principle requires the empowering statute to clearly delineate 
the purpose (or purposes) for which property may be expropriated, since 
the state may expropriate property only for purposes permitted by the 
authorising legislation.29 In this regard the legality principle informs the 
                                                                                                                       
125 (T) para 23; Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 
658 671; Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258. Also see 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 9-10; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 453; Van 
der Walt and Marais 2012 LitNet Akademies 304-305; Roux "Property" 33. 
25  Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 81; Groengras 
Eiendomme (Pyt) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002 1 SA 125 (T) para 
23; Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258; Joyce & McGregor Ltd 
v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. Also see Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 344, 452-456; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman 566; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 9-10, 49, 93. 
26  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) paras 56 and 58; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 
20; Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 
144. Also see Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 13. Compare Van der 
Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 212-213. 
27  Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671; Pretoria 
City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258; Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 81; Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein 
Unlawful Occupants 2002 1 SA 125 (T) para 23; s 2(3) of the Expropriation Bill B4D-
2015. Also see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 453-454; Gildenhuys and 
Grobler "Expropriation" para 12; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 10, 49-59.  
28  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 9-10; s 2(3) of the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015. Also see 
Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002 1 SA 
125 (T) para 23; City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 
JDR 0786 (SCA) (Arun (SCA)) para 23. However, in Arun (CC) para 38 Moseneke 
DCJ seems to reject the finding of Mathopo AJA in Arun (SCA) that the statute must 
provide for a procedure whereby expropriation may take place. Nonetheless, s 2(3) 
of the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015 will override this obiter dictum once it is signed 
into law.  
29  Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 81; Groengras 
Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002 1 SA 125 (T) para 
23; L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality; Cape Town 
Municipality v L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 2 SA 256 (C) 268; White River 
Village Council v H L Hall & Sons Ltd 1958 2 SA 524 (A) 530-531; Broadway 
Mansions (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council 1955 1 SA 517 (A) 522; Estate Geekie v 
Union Government 1948 2 SA 494 (N) 502-503; Van Eck and Van Rensburg v Etna 
Stores 1947 2 SA 984 (A) 996-998. Also see Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" 
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law-of-general-application requirement in section 25(2),30 which requires 
the applicable law to be sufficiently precise and specific.31 The power to 
expropriate for purposes ulterior to the empowering statute therefore does 
not exist – such (attempted) expropriations are ultra vires the authorising 
legislation and must be set aside by a court.32 Consequently, the state 
may not expropriate property for purposes other than those permitted by 
the empowering statute, irrespective of how laudable these ulterior 
purposes may be.33 Against this background section 28 of LUPO must be 
distinguished from statutes that permit expropriation for a wide range of 
purposes. Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act is one such example, since 
it allows the Minister to expropriate property for any purpose that is a 
public purpose or in the public interest (if one reads section 2(1) with 
section 25(2) of the Constitution).34 The purpose for which land indicated 
as public streets on a development plan may vest in the local authority 
pursuant to section 28 of LUPO, on the other hand, is limited to the 
provision of public roads required for the normal need of the planned 
development.35  
Furthermore, a valid expropriation requires the payment of just and 
equitable compensation, as required by section 25(2)(b) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution. In the absence of a compensation provision in the authorising 
                                                                                                                       
para 13; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 452-456; Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg 10, 49-59.  
30  See similarly Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation 217-219, 244.  
31  Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-48–34-50. See similarly Hoops 2016 SALJ ss 
IV and V(b), who argues that the preciseness requirement of the law-of-general-
application requirement is comparable to the principle of specificity 
(Bestimmtheitsgebot) in German expropriation law. In the German context this 
principle requires that legislation which authorises expropriation "should sufficiently 
specify the purposes and the projects for which property can be expropriated" 
(Hoops 2016 SALJ s IV). 
32  Administrateur, Transvaal v Quid Pro Quo Eiendomsmaatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 
SA 829 (A) 837-842, which was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister of 
Education v Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC) paras 17-19. See similarly L F Boshoff 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality; Cape Town Municipality v L F 
Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 2 SA 256 (C) 268; White River Village Council v 
H L Hall & Sons Ltd 1958 2 SA 524 (A) 530-531; Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v 
Pretoria City Council 1955 1 SA 517 (A) 522; Estate Geekie v Union Government 
1948 2 SA 494 (N) 502-503. Also see Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 
13; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 49, 59 fn 80. Compare the position in German 
expropriation law: see Hoops 2016 SALJ s IV and the sources he cites. 
33  Van Eck and Van Rensburg v Etna Stores 1947 2 SA 984 (A), citing Fernwood 
Estates Ltd v Cape Town Municipal Council 1933 CPD 399 403. 
34  Hoops 2016 SALJ ss I and III(b). Compare s 3(1) of the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015. 
35  See similarly Arun (CC) para 40. Also see Marais 2016 SALJ. 
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legislation there is a rebuttable presumption that the statute does not 
authorise expropriation at all.36 In this context it must be emphasised that 
expropriation is justified only by the valid purpose it serves and not by the 
mere payment of compensation.37 Compensation for expropriation must 
therefore be carefully distinguished from damages for delict, since 
expropriatory compensation is the result of a lawful (as opposed to an 
unlawful) property limitation under section 25(2).38 
Moseneke DCJ did not focus on the state acquisition requirement to 
establish whether section 28 of LUPO authorises expropriation, although 
he did refer to it in passing.39 This may be attributed to the fact that this 
requirement is (according to Moseneke DCJ's interpretation of section 28) 
satisfied on the facts – the local authority acquires property in the form of 
excess land from the developer upon approval of the subdivision 
application under section 25 of LUPO. Yet he did rely on the two other 
characteristics mentioned above to decide the expropriation question. The 
fact that these features were satisfied on the facts led him to rule that 
section 28 results in expropriation of excess land.40 However, as 
discussed earlier, these two characteristics are unable to accurately 
categorise a property limitation as either deprivation or expropriation. 
Interestingly, Moseneke DCJ referred to the purpose of section 28 and 
held that the "compulsory taking away of excess land without 
compensation is not properly related to the purpose of developing a 
                                            
36  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 18, citing Belinco (Pty) Ltd v Bellville Municipality 1970 4 
SA 589 (A). Also see Marais 2016 SALJ s III(b) and compare Administrator, Cape v 
Associated Buildings Ltd 1957 2 SA 317 (A); Administrator, Cape Province v 
Ruyteplaats Estates (Pty), Ltd 1952 1 SA 541 (A); Steyn Uitleg van Wette 105-107. 
Although ss 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution does not stipulate that the 
authorising statute must specifically provide for the nature and amount of 
compensation (compare the linking clause or Junktim Klausel in Article 14.3.2 GG: 
see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 366-367 and fn 114; Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses 149-151, citing BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981); Kleyn 1996 
SAPL 435), it could be argued that this presumption in South African law performs a 
function comparable to that of the linking clause in German law. 
37  Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 82; Minister of Minerals 
and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 18, which was not 
overturned by the Constitutional Court on appeal. Also see Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 496; Slade 2013 TSAR 199 and compare Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg 65. 
38  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 3; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 442. 
39  Arun (CC) para 58, quoting with approval from City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park 
Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA) para 40 which, in turn, relies on 
Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515. 
40  Arun (CC) paras 54-62. 
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township with adequate public roads and spaces".41 He also ruled, albeit 
by way of obiter dicta, that section 28 does not authorise a deprivation of 
property beyond the normal need of the development, as such deprivation 
would take place outside legislative authority.42 Against this background 
he concluded that the appellant must be compensated if section 28 is to 
comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution.  
Moseneke DCJ's finding that section 28 authorises an expropriation which 
must be compensated is characterised by three flaws if regard is had to 
the requirements in section 25(2). The first concerns the purpose of the 
expropriation in view of the law-of-general-application requirement and the 
principle of legality. The fact that the vesting of excess land under section 
28 is – according to the Court – not properly related to the purpose the 
provision seeks to achieve means that the power to expropriate land for 
purposes other than the normal need of the development does not exist. 
Stated differently, section 28 does not in any way authorise expropriation 
of excess land.43 The fact that the vesting of excess land in the local 
authority could serve a purpose which may be valid in another context (ie 
to aid the construction of future higher-order roads) does not mean that 
section 28 authorises the expropriation of such land.44 To answer the 
authorisation question it must be established whether or not section 28 
permits the expropriation of excess land to realise this latter purpose.  
The purpose of section 28 is to develop townships with adequate public 
roads and spaces.45 This purpose does not envisage the expropriation of 
excess land and section 28, when understood in view of the legality 
principle, therefore does not grant the state the power to expropriate 
excess land in this context.46 The purpose which the vesting of excess 
land seeks to achieve is simply ultra vires the empowering statute and any 
expropriation aimed at realising this purpose is therefore invalid. The fact 
that the provision does not set out the circumstances, procedures and 
conditions upon which expropriation may take place, while also not 
                                            
41  Arun (CC) para 40.  
42  Arun (CC) para 60. 
43  For comparable criticism of the Arun judgment, see Hoops 2016 SALJ s V(b). 
44  Van Eck and Van Rensburg v Etna Stores 1947 2 SA 984 (A), citing Fernwood 
Estates Ltd v Cape Town Municipal Council 1933 CPD 399 403. 
45  See Arun (CC) para 40 and compare Club Mykonos Langebaan Ltd v Langebaan 
Country Estate Joint Venture 2009 3 SA 546 (C) paras 35-36; South Peninsula 
Municipality v Malherbe 1999 2 SA 966 (C) 981-982. 
46  See similarly Arun (SCA) para 23. 
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providing compensation, supports this argument.47 In addition, case law 
and academic scholarship on section 28 reveal that it vests land indicated 
as public streets in the local authority only in so far as it is required for the 
normal need of the development.48 What the normal need of the 
development entails is a factual question that will differ from case to 
case.49 The vesting of land required for the normal need of the 
development merely amounts to a non-arbitrary deprivation of property 
that does not require compensation.50 Furthermore, other decisions on 
section 28 of LUPO (and also its predecessor)51 reveal that any attempt by 
a local authority to acquire land unrelated to the normal need of the 
development is ultra vires the provision and therefore invalid.52  
The above line of reasoning is strengthened by the Court's ruling that the 
provision does not authorise any deprivation of property beyond the 
normal need of the development. It is worth mentioning that, in view of the 
subset distinction between deprivation and expropriation laid down in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance53 (FNB), it is difficult to see how a provision can result in 
expropriation – the most extreme property limitation – if it does not even 
authorise deprivation, which is a lesser form of limitation.54 Moseneke 
                                            
47  Section 28 merely stipulates that compensation is not payable – it does not, by 
necessary implication, reveal when compensation is payable: see Marais 2016 SALJ 
s III(c)(i). For a contrary view, see Arun (CC) para 33 (citing Heher JA in City of 
Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA) para 41) 
and Van Wyk 2016 PELJ 16-17. 
48  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 270-272, 289-291; Van der Walt 2008 
ASSL 245-247; Van Wyk Planning Law 369-372; Slade 2016 PELJ 4, 13-14; Marais 
2016 SALJ s III(c)(ii). For a contrary view, see Arun (CC) para 32 and Van Wyk 2016 
PELJ 16-17. 
49  Compare Dolan v City of Tigard 512 US 374 (1994). 
50  See the sources mentioned in fn 48 above. Moseneke DCJ seems to endorse this 
view: see Arun (CC) paras 35 and 40. Also see Van Wyk 2016 PELJ 19-20. 
51  Township Ordinance 33 of 1934 (C). 
52  South Peninsula Municipality v Malherbe 1999 2 SA 966 (C); Club Mykonos 
Langebaan Ltd v Langebaan Country Estate Joint Venture 2009 3 SA 546 (C); 
Belinco (Pty) Ltd v Bellville Municipality 1970 4 SA 589 (A); Administrator, Cape 
Province v Ruyteplaats Estates (Pty), Ltd 1952 1 SA 541 (A); Administrator, Cape v 
Associated Buildings Ltd 1957 2 SA 317 (A). Also see Marais 2016 SALJ s III(b). 
53  2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
54  Marais 2016 SALJ s III(c)(ii). See similarly Slade 2016 PELJ 14-15 and fn 49. 
According to Marais (at s III(c)(ii)) this finding raises the question whether the Court 
still adheres to the FNB subset distinction or has perhaps returned to the conceptual 
distinction (see Van der Walt and Botha 1998 SAPL) laid down in Harksen to 
distinguish between deprivation and expropriation. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that Moseneke DCJ did not refer to either of these cases in his judgment, despite 
that fact that he agreed with Mogoeng CJ's majority ruling in Agri SA, where the FNB 
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DCJ's finding that section 28 does not authorise a deprivation of excess 
land therefore undermines his conclusion that this provision results in an 
expropriation of such land under section 25(2). 
The second flaw pertains to the function of compensation under section 
25(2). As mentioned above, expropriation is justified only by the public 
purpose or public interest it serves. Compensation is therefore merely a 
consequence of a valid expropriation and not a justification for it. The 
reference in section 28 to when compensation is not payable is unhelpful 
for determining whether the provision authorises expropriation, since the 
mere payment of compensation cannot bring a purpose, which is 
otherwise beyond the scope of the empowering provision, within its ambit. 
The purpose behind an expropriation is either sanctioned by the legislation 
or it is not. Consequently, the power to expropriate in this context cannot 
be brought into existence simply by awarding compensation to the 
affected party ex post facto. Moseneke DCJ's award of compensation to 
Arun for an expropriation which aims to realise a purpose ulterior to 
section 28 of LUPO is therefore misplaced. 
Finally, the Court overemphasised the effect of the property limitation to 
decide the expropriation question by focusing on two of the three 
characteristics of expropriation discussed above. The pitfalls associated 
with – and possible solutions to – such an effect-centred approach to 
decide the expropriation question have been dealt with in more detail 
elsewhere and will hence not be repeated here.55 Suffice it to say, as 
stated earlier, that the distinction between deprivation and expropriation 
does not pivot on the effect of the limitation.56 It seems that the danger of 
Mogoeng CJ's effect-centred approach adopted in Agri SA for deciding the 
expropriation question – which simply focuses on the effect of the property 
limitation – has indeed been realised in Arun.57 For this reason, and the 
two others discussed above, Moseneke DCJ's finding that section 28 of 
LUPO authorises the expropriation of excess land which requires 
compensation is unconvincing.58 
                                                                                                                       
subset distinction was approved. Nevertheless, this interesting matter is beyond the 
scope of our article. 
55  See Marais 2015 PELJ (Part I); Marais 2015 PELJ (Part II). 
56  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 347-349. 
57  This danger is pointed out by Marais 2015 PELJ (Part I); Marais 2015 PELJ (Part II). 
58  See similarly Marais 2016 SALJ. Also see Van der Sijde Reconsidering the 
Relationship between Property and Regulation 7-8. 
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Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the absence of a nexus between 
the vesting of excess land and the purpose behind it, namely to aid the 
construction of future higher-order roads, would result in section 28 being 
unconstitutional if Arun were not compensated for the loss of this land.59 
Moseneke DCJ thus preferred to save section 28 by giving it a meaning 
that is – seemingly – "at peace" with section 25(2). Such a meaning, in his 
view, requires interpreting the provision as providing compensation for the 
expropriation of excess land.60 However, first principles reveal that the 
vesting of excess land under section 28 in actual fact results in an invalid 
expropriation not properly related to a purpose authorised by this 
provision. Still, the fact that Moseneke DCJ interpreted section 28 as 
authorising expropriation makes it necessary to ascertain the method of 
expropriation under this provision. 
3.2 Method of expropriation  
South African law appears to recognise three methods of expropriation, 
namely administrative expropriation, judicial expropriation and statutory 
expropriation.61 Administrative expropriation entails that expropriation is 
brought about by administrative action where an administrator, acting in 
terms of an empowering statute, exercises a discretion when deciding to 
expropriate property for a purpose permitted by the empowering statute.62 
Judicial expropriation occurs where the expropriation is affected by a court 
order.63 Statutory expropriation, in turn, is brought about directly by the 
                                            
59  Arun (CC) para 41. Compare the finding that compensation is not required for the 
vesting of land in the local authority which is required for the normal need of the 
development: see Arun (CC) paras 35, 40. 
60  Marais 2016 SALJ addresses the problems of such a construal from an 
interpretation-of-statutes perspective. 
61  Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 456-458. Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 14-15, 77-78 gives only mentions 
administrative and judicial expropriation as the two methods of expropriation in 
South African law. Compare s 2(3) of the Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, which seems 
to exclude statutory expropriation (and perhaps also constructive expropriation) as a 
method for expropriation in South African law. 
62  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 14-15; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 456; 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3. The majority of expropriations occur 
by way of administrative action: see Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 14-15; Gildenhuys 
and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3. 
63  Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 14. 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3 and Roux "Property" 33 mention 
expropriation in favour of a labour tenant under the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996 as an example of judicial expropriation. 
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enactment of legislation and in the absence of any administrative action.64 
It is unclear whether South African law actually recognises this latter 
method of expropriation, although the Supreme Court of Appeal seems to 
assume that it does.65  
Identifying the method of expropriation under section 28, however, is no 
easy task. Moseneke DCJ's findings as to the actual cause of the vesting 
of excess land in the local authority – namely whether it occurred by 
operation of law or because of the approval of the development plan – 
appear to be contradictory. He initially holds that the vesting occurs by 
operation of law after approval of the subdivision application, which 
creates the impression that the expropriation took place by way of 
administrative action.66 Yet he ruled elsewhere that the "loss of ownership 
is compelled by law, and not by the decision of the local authority",67 which 
seems to point to statutory expropriation.68 Closer examination, however, 
reveals that the latter finding is inaccurate. The phrase "ex lege" or "by 
operation of law" means that certain legal consequences follow upon 
satisfaction of objective requirements set by law and in the absence of any 
decision (in the form of administrative action). An example of such a 
consequence is the extinguishment of old order rights under the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA). 
According to the transitional provisions69 of the MPRDA, old order rights70 
remained in force for certain periods of time after the commencement of 
the Act. If the holders of these rights failed (or were unable) to convert 
them into new order rights, they ceased to exist at the expiration of the 
                                            
64  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 457; Gildenhuys and Grobler 
"Expropriation" para 3; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 435-436. 
65  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 15. This 
finding was not overturned by the Constitutional Court on appeal. See further the 
discussion in fn 61 above. 
66  Arun (CC) para 40. Compare para 61, where the Court – with reference to the 
wording of s 28 – held that the vesting is a direct sequel of the confirmation of the 
subdivision. See similarly Van der Walt 2014 ASSL with reference to para 70 of the 
judgment. 
67  Arun (CC) para 59 (emphasis added). Compare para 65. Yet, in the very next 
sentence after the quoted phrase Moseneke DCJ states that the vesting "occurs 
instantly upon confirmation of the subdivision", which indicates that the vesting 
depends on the approval of the subdivision application and does not occur ex lege.  
68  See similarly Van der Walt 2014 ASSL; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the 
Relationship between Property and Regulation 5-6, 202-203. 
69  Items 6-8 of Schedule II to the MPRDA. 
70  These included old order prospecting rights, old order mining rights and unused old 
order rights. 
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relevant period.71 The extinction of these old order rights, which amounted 
to constitutional property,72 occurred by operation of law and did not 
depend on the exercise of any discretion. The fact that a developer's loss 
of excess land, which is the result of the vesting under section 28 of 
LUPO, cannot occur without the approval of the subdivision application by 
the local authority under section 25 – which entails the exercise of a 
discretion – therefore undermines the finding that such vesting could have 
occurred ex lege.73 The approval of the development plan is simply a 
conditio sine qua non for the vesting of any land in the local authority. 
Indeed, section 28 stipulates that "ownership of all public streets … over or 
on land indicated as such at the granting of an application for subdivision 
under section 25 shall, after the confirmation of such subdivision or part 
thereof, vest in the local authority".74 It is therefore impossible to divorce 
the consequence (ie the vesting of excess land) from its cause (ie the 
approval of a subdivision application pursuant to section 25). It follows that 
no land – whether required for the normal need of the development or in 
excess of such need – can vest in the local authority without the approval 
of a subdivision application. Consequently, the vesting was caused by a 
decision to grant approval of an application to subdivide, which is 
administrative action and must hence comply with the requirements for 
just administrative action under section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA.75 
An administrator acting in terms of section 25 will thus have to be mindful 
of the interrelatedness of this provision with the "expropriatory element" in 
section 28 when approving development plans. It follows that the 
expropriation of excess land under section 28 most probably took place by 
way of administrative expropriation.76  
                                            
71  The periods for which old order prospecting rights, old order mining rights and 
unused old order rights continued to be in force after the commencement of the 
MPRDA were two years, five years and one year respectively.  
72  Agri SA paras 32-46. 
73  See similarly Slade 2016 PELJ 4. 
74  Emphasis added. 
75  See similarly Van Wyk 2016 PELJ 14. PAJA defines administrative action as "any 
decision taken … by an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing 
a public function in terms of any legislation … which adversely affects the rights of 
any person and which has direct, external legal effect". Interestingly, Moseneke DCJ 
appears to recognise the fact that the expropriation was caused by administrative 
action towards the end of his judgment: see Van der Walt 2014 ASSL, referring to 
Arun (CC) para 70. 
76  For a different view, see Van der Walt 2014 ASSL, who thinks that Moseneke DCJ 
categorised the expropriation under s 28 as statutory expropriation. See similarly 
Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 5-6, 
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3.3 The status of invalid administrative expropriations 
An expropriation that does not comply with one or more of the 
requirements in section 25(2) is invalid.77 Such an expropriation may be 
described as being defective, since it does not comply with all the 
requirements for it to be valid. This makes it is necessary, in view of the 
discussion in the previous section, to investigate the status of invalid 
administrative expropriations. 
In Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town78 (Oudekraal) the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that an unlawful or invalid administrative 
act exists in fact and is capable of producing valid legal consequences for 
as long as it is not set aside by a court in proceedings for judicial review.79 
In the Court's view it is unhelpful to use the concepts of "void" and 
"voidable" when deciding the validity of unlawful administrative acts; the 
focus should rather fall on whether such acts exist in law or in fact.80 The 
first step of the inquiry therefore entails ascertaining whether an initial 
administrative act's substantive or legal validity is a necessary 
                                                                                                                       
202-203, who describes the vesting of excess land as an ex lege expropriation. 
Slade 2016 PELJ 18-21, however, questions whether the vesting of excess land in 
the local authority pursuant to s 28 of LUPO amounts to statutory expropriation (or 
even constructive expropriation). Slade (21-22) also points out that LUPO does not 
provide a formal expropriation procedure whereby an administrator may expropriate 
property, which detracts from recognising the vesting of excess land as a formal 
administrative expropriation. We think his argument is correct in so far as it 
underscores the invalidity of any "expropriation" which might occur under s 28 of 
LUPO: see s 3.3 below. For a contrary view, see Van Wyk 2016 PELJ 19-21, who 
argues that the vesting in the municipality of land indicated as public roads (whether 
based on the normal need of the development or in excess thereof) results in a s 
25(1) deprivation and not expropriation. 
77  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 105-109, citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers paras 50-
51: "What would have been ultra vires the common law by reason of a functionary 
exceeding a statutory power is invalid under the Constitution according to the 
doctrine of legality." See similarly Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 13; 
Hoexter Administrative Law 255-256. 
78  2004 6 SA 222 (SCA). 
79  Oudekraal para 26. Also see Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 
1 SA 170 (SCA) para 13; Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v 
Harrison 2011 4 SA 42 (CC) para 62. See similarly Gildenhuys and Grobler 
"Expropriation" para 26. The same probably holds true for the exercise of public 
power in the absence of administrative action as well: see Hoexter Administrative 
Law 254-255. 
80  Oudekraal paras 27-30. In view of these findings the distinction made by Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg 107 (citing Wiechers Administratiefreg 179, 336) between void and 
voidable expropriations no longer has merit. This is probably the reason why 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 26 no longer make this distinction. 
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precondition for the validity of subsequent administrative acts.81 The same 
logic applies to the validity of legal consequences that flow from a valid 
expropriation. In the expropriation context this means that only an 
expropriation that exists in law is capable of producing valid legal 
consequences, such as vesting property in the state against payment of 
compensation under section 25(2). Indeed, the "rule of law dictates that 
the coercive power of the State [such as expropriation] cannot generally 
be used against the subject unless the initiating act is legally valid".82 It 
should hence be impermissible for litigants to claim (or for courts to award) 
compensation for an expropriation that exists only in fact. After all, it is 
unclear on what basis a party would be able to claim (and for courts to 
award) expropriatory compensation in the absence of a valid 
expropriation. 
To ascertain the substantive validity of an administrative expropriation, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two types of defects, namely non-
material and material defects.83 An example of a non-material defect 
pertains to the accidental omission of the amount of compensation in the 
expropriation notice served on the expropriatee.84 Defects of this nature 
are insubstantial and ought not – on their own – to invalidate an 
administrative expropriation.85 In such circumstances a court should be 
able to condone the deficiency at the insistence of the affected party. In 
other words, if the defect relates to a non-essential aspect of the 
requirements for a valid expropriation, the affected party should be 
afforded an election whether or not to condone the shortcoming against 
the payment of compensation. 
However, the same should not apply to situations where the defect 
pertains to the essence or substance of an expropriation, in other words to 
materially defective expropriations. The previous section identifies three 
grounds that draw the substantive validity of the expropriation in Arun into 
question – the vesting of excess land in Arun is thus a prime example of 
                                            
81  Oudekraal paras 31-32. Property holders affected by unlawful administrative acts, 
even though they are valid until set aside, are entitled to ignore them by raising a 
defensive or collateral challenge to the validity of the administrative act: see 
Oudekraal paras 32, 35; and Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 26. 
82  Oudekraal para 37. 
83  See similarly Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 85-87. 
84  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 86, citing Redelinghuys v Stadsraad van Pretoria 1990 1 
SA 555 (T) 558. Gildenhuys (86) also discusses further examples of non-material 
defects. 
85  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 87. 
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an expropriation that suffers from a number of material defects.86 The 
outcome in this case raises the question whether a materially defective 
expropriation that therefore exists only in fact and not in law may be 
treated as a legally valid one that requires the payment of just and 
equitable compensation, especially since compensation follows on a valid 
expropriation only. The way in which the Court decided the expropriation 
question creates the impression that an expropriation will be in order – 
irrespective of its level of defectiveness – as long as it serves some 
conceivable public interest, against payment of compensation to the 
affected party. This has major implications for the principles of 
expropriation law, since an affected property holder may very likely (like 
Arun) prefer to receive compensation instead of reviewing the (apparent) 
expropriation under PAJA to have it set aside. In this regard Moseneke 
DCJ's ruling not only subverts established expropriation principles, as 
discussed above,87 but also contradicts pre-constitutional case law, where 
defective expropriations comparable to the one in Arun were simply 
declared invalid and of no effect.88 Although the FNB court held that pre-
constitutional decisions should be treated with circumspection when 
interpreting the property clause,89 this does not mean they should be 
ignored. The fact that one of the cases,90 where the then Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court set aside an expropriation aimed at 
realising a purpose ultra vires the empowering statute, was confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court91 indicates the relevance of (at least some) pre-
constitutional judgments for adjudicating section 25(2) disputes.92 
Moseneke DCJ's decision, in as far as it affords litigants a choice between 
different sources of law that may both be applicable to a set of facts, is 
                                            
86  See the discussion in s 3.1 above. 
87  See the discussion in s 3.1 above. 
88  Administrateur, Transvaal v Quid Pro Quo Eiendomsmaatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 
SA 829 (A) 837-842 (confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Education v 
Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC) paras 17-19); L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town Municipality; Cape Town Municipality v L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 
2 SA 256 (C) 268; White River Village Council v H L Hall & Sons Ltd 1958 2 SA 524 
(A) 530-531; Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council 1955 1 SA 517 
(A) 522; Estate Geekie v Union Government 1948 2 SA 494 (N) 502-503. 
89  FNB para 59. 
90  Administrateur, Transvaal v Quid Pro Quo Eiendomsmaatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 
SA 829 (A). 
91  Minister of Education v Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC) paras 17-19. 
92  Ironically, the pre-constitutional position appears to be nearer to what the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights requires of the single system of law than the 
one adopted in Arun (CC): see the discussion of the subsidiarity principles in s 4.2 
below. 
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furthermore at odds with the single-system-of-law principle. The Arun 
judgment creates parallel fields of law (expropriation law vis-à-vis 
administrative law) by permitting litigants to choose between claiming 
compensation for a materially defective expropriation under section 25(2) 
or having it reviewed in terms of administrative law (under PAJA, read with 
section 33) and set aside.93 Such an approach disregards the subsidiarity 
principles developed by the Constitutional Court and may result in 
outcomes contrary to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.94 
Litigation under section 25(2) ought in any event – if properly adjudicated 
– to confirm the outcome of a case based on PAJA, since the property 
clause (which is part of a single legal system that includes section 33 and 
PAJA) is unable to produce an outcome where an unlawful administrative 
act is treated as valid (and requires compensation) if such an outcome 
would promote administrative injustice through sanctioning unjust 
administrative action.95 
Consequently, we argue that courts should not be allowed to uphold 
materially defective expropriations in the nature of Arun against the 
payment of compensation, irrespective of whether the expropriation serves 
a purpose ultra vires the empowering statute or whether the affected 
property holder might prefer to receive compensation instead of having the 
expropriation declared invalid and set aside. This is because the 
expropriation does not exist in law, which makes it impossible for it to 
generate valid legal consequences such as vesting property in the local 
authority against payment of compensation. The default remedy for such 
expropriations should simply be to set the expropriation aside on the basis 
that it is invalid. 
                                            
93  We rely on Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation 206 to make this argument, who identifies this as one of the possible 
instances of parallel legal development. She (205-210) identifies the development of 
different sources of law (ie the Constitution vis-à-vis legislation or the common law) 
and different constitutional notions (ie meaningful engagement vis-à-vis procedural 
fairness) as two other instances where parallel legal development may also occur. 
The subsidiarity principles are discussed in s 4.2 below. 
94  See similarly Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation 202-203. See further the discussion in s 4.2 below. 
95  We rely on Van der Walt Property and Constitution 45 to make this argument. Also 
see Van der Walt's discussion (101 fn 250) of BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 324, where 
he summarises the decision as follows: "it is not constitutionally unjust to expect a 
person whose rights are affected by administrative action to first attack the action in 
the administrative courts". Compare Kleyn 1996 SAPL 435 fn 186, 440. See further 
the discussion of the subsidiarity principles in s 4.2 below. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In the light of the above, Moseneke DCJ's categorising of the vesting 
under section 28 as an expropriation that requires compensation is 
problematic. Instead of setting the materially defective expropriation aside 
for not complying with the requirements for a valid expropriation, 
Moseneke DCJ "saved" the provision by awarding compensation to Arun. 
He followed this approach despite the fact that the purpose of the 
expropriation is not sanctioned by section 28 of LUPO. The Court could 
simply have held that the attempted expropriation is ultra vires the 
authorising provision and of no effect, thereby obviating the necessity to 
decide the constitutionality of section 28.96 Yet the Court's ruling suggests 
that non-compliance with one of the substantive requirements for 
expropriation affords an election to the affected property holder whether to 
uphold the expropriation so as to receive compensation or to have it set 
aside. Such a conclusion is erroneous given the role of the public interest 
requirement in view of the authorisation requirement, the function of 
compensation in section 25(2), and the distinction between deprivation 
and expropriation. 
Non-compliance with a non-material requirement ought not to render an 
expropriation invalid per se. However, the same cannot be said of an 
expropriation that suffers from a material defect. In this context Moseneke 
DCJ's ruling creates the impression that courts are free to treat materially 
defective expropriations as legally valid by merely awarding compensation 
to the affected party.97 The fact that the Court decided to uphold the 
defective expropriation not only creates problems under section 25(2), but 
also has repercussions for the subsidiarity principles and administrative 
justice under section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA. For these reasons 
                                            
96  Marais 2016 SALJ s III(c)(ii). 
97  Arun (CC) para 41. Another possibility of explaining Moseneke DCJ's award of 
compensation to Arun for the vesting of excess land in the local authority might be to 
view it as a form of what Van der Walt calls "equalisation payments". See Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 274-282. However, such an explanation is unlikely 
given the fact that these payments, which must be distinguished from compensation 
for expropriation, are usually paid for excessive but otherwise lawful deprivations: 
see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 270-282 and Bezuidenhout 
Compensation ch 4. Given the fact that s 28 does not authorise a deprivation of land 
beyond the normal need of the development (Arun CC para 60), it is difficult to see 
how the compensation Moseneke DCJ awarded to Arun could be some form of 
equalisation payment.  
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the next section considers the role of administrative law when adjudicating 
expropriation cases.98  
4 The relevance of administrative law 
4.1 Introduction 
At first glance Arun appears to have little to say about administrative law. 
In fact, the judgment disposes of its relevance in a single paragraph.99 
However, a close reading of the facts and the legal problem before the 
Court strongly suggests that administrative law cannot be summarily 
discounted. The argument we present here is not that the Court must have 
applied administrative law, but rather that administrative law should have 
been considered more seriously. The section also focuses on the Court's 
reasons for not deciding the case in terms of administrative law principles. 
Moseneke DCJ describes the relevance of administrative law as 
follows:100 
It is by no means clear that Arun or a developer in its position would be able to 
seek judicial review of the structure plan only for the reason that it makes 
provision for higher-order roads which must be provided for in its subdivision 
application. If the review were to occur under PAJA, as it must, the developer 
will have to confront a legion of obstacles. It will have to find a decision to 
impugn. As we have seen vesting occurs ex lege. It will have to seek 
condonation to overcome the 180-day time bar given that structure plans have 
long life cycles. It will have to conjure up discrete PAJA review grounds 
connected to the reasonableness and rationality of the structure plan, its failure 
to account for a relevant consideration, or a mistake of fact or law and so 
forth.101 
The scant attention paid to administrative law is not significant in itself. It is 
significant, though, that the local authority raised the relevance of 
administrative law and that the Court dismissed it so easily. The Court 
justifies this ruling on the basis of internal remedies, yet it does not 
respond to the issue of authorisation for expropriation and compensation, 
an argument put forward by the city, which has a bearing on the validity of 
                                            
98  The subsidiarity principles, which are discussed in s 4.2 below, underscore the 
relevance of administrative law when adjudicating s 25(2) cases.  
99  Arun (CC) para 66. 
100  This paragraph appears in Moseneke DCJ's discussion on the need for the 
exhaustion of remedies under the heading "[d]id the applicant exhaust its remedies?" 
However, the question actually addressed by the Court in this part of the judgment is 
rather "[w]as Arun obliged to make use of an appeal or review process?" (Arun (CC) 
para 63). 
101  Arun (CC) para 66 (fn omitted). 
EJ MARAIS & PJH MAREE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)   23 
 
the expropriation.102 Furthermore, it is significant – if not disconcerting – 
that a coherent methodology for deciding whether or not to apply 
administrative law is lacking. 
Arun provides an interesting case study on the relationship between 
expropriation law (in terms of section 25(2)) and administrative law. A 
private party, Arun, is involved in litigation with a local authority exercising 
its public authority.103 Ownership is evaluated in the light of the 
Constitution, legislation, case law, applications for subdivision and 
agreements. Thus, a number of private and public considerations and 
instruments are at play. Ostensibly, the facts suggest that the question of 
whether or not administrative law should apply would have been 
entertained in earnest. Given the facts and the broad characterisation of 
the case, it is unclear why Arun was not decided with reference to PAJA 
and section 33. Courts are not strictly limited to the arguments proffered 
by the parties. For instance, in Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs104 (Bato Star) O'Regan J directed the parties to 
present their arguments in terms of PAJA.105 It is unclear why PAJA was 
any less relevant in Arun. 
Since the Court did not discuss the relevance of administrative law in 
Arun, this contribution cannot assess the Court's approach directly. 
However, our investigation focuses on what the Court neglected to 
consider. We identify a number of considerations that could assist courts 
in determining whether administrative law should be considered, if not 
applied, in a given case. In other words, our focus is on what a court 
should consider for establishing whether administrative law is relevant or 
not. 
4.2 The internal coherency of the law in view of the subsidiarity 
principles 
The first consideration concerns the type of protection the law seeks to 
provide through the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Should it be 
possible to obtain very different remedies simply by choosing a remedy 
based on one fundamental right rather than another? Do the various 
constitutional rights provide similar, but not identical, protection in relation 
                                            
102  Arun (CC) para 27. 
103  Such as the power to expropriate, according to the Court. 
104  2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
105  Bato Star paras 21, 26. 
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to the same set of facts? There is an apparent conflict between the 
appellant's choice regarding a cause of action and the type of protection 
the law seeks to provide. For instance, if a litigant were to formulate a 
complaint on the basis of claiming compensation for an alleged 
expropriation, rather than the right to administrative justice, would he or 
she be entitled to very different remedies? If so, is a litigant entitled to 
exercise this choice absolutely?106 The answers to these questions have 
far-reaching implications. Indeed, it might very well prove to be more 
lucrative for a litigant to base his or her cause of action on the right to 
receive compensation for expropriation under section 25(2) rather than to 
have the expropriation reviewed and set aside under PAJA. Do courts 
have a say in the applicable legal principles or are they bound to the 
arguments of the parties? How does a court choose between applying 
section 25(2) or PAJA, which was enacted to give effect to section 33?107 
Should it make a difference where both are applicable? If these questions 
are not taken seriously, courts will not address the phenomenon of 
litigants cherry picking the cause of action that best suits their own 
interests, sometimes at the expense of other legally relevant 
considerations.108 The potential of a financially more rewarding remedy 
under section 25(2) of the Constitution, as opposed to PAJA, seems to 
have been part of Arun's strategy. 
Arun sought protection of its right to receive compensation under section 
25(2) for an alleged expropriation. Yet, for reasons discussed earlier, it 
appears that no valid expropriation had occurred.109 The expropriation of 
excess land is not permitted by the purpose of section 28 of LUPO – it is 
therefore ultra vires the authorising statute and should be set aside by a 
court. Yet if a court refuses to entertain the question of authorisation (in 
terms of either the legality principle under the law-of-general-application 
requirement in section 25(2) or lawfulness under PAJA) a finding of 
invalidity becomes remote. Where the argument is made that expropriation 
took place, the legal challenge must address the lawfulness of the 
decision that results in the expropriation. Normally no compensation would 
be due for an invalid expropriation, since expropriation is justified by the 
valid purpose it serves and not the mere payment of compensation.110 
                                            
106  Hoexter Administrative Law 255; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35 et seq. 
107  See the discussion of the subsidiarity principles in the paragraphs that follow. 
108  See similarly Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation 205-206. 
109  See the discussion in s 3.1 above. 
110  See the discussion in s 3.1 above. 
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However, this approach to solving the problem is possible only if argument 
refers to the legality principle or lawfulness under PAJA. On the whole 
there seems to be a lack of methodology in the Court's approach for 
deciding cases where two constitutional rights are at play. 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Chaskalson P held as follows regarding 
the nature of the Constitution: 
I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body of 
law separate and distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of 
law, each dealing with the same subject matter, each having similar 
requirements, each operating in its own field with its own highest court. 
There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from 
the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.111 
A claim of compensation is more likely under some rights, such as 
section 25(2), whereas the same remedy is more unlikely in terms of other 
rights, such as under section 33 and PAJA.112 Where the Court grants 
compensation in terms of section 25(2) without giving that right content in 
relation to administrative justice, in terms of which compensation is 
unlikely, it seems that the Constitutional Court is subverting the single-
system-of-law principle by creating parallel fields of law (ie expropriation 
law vis-à-vis administrative law).113 In this regard Moseneke DCJ decided 
the case before him in terms of expropriation law by awarding Arun 
compensation under section 25(2) for the alleged expropriation, without 
reference to the applicability of administrative law.114 If all implicated rights 
in a given set of facts do not inform each other the law is not operating as 
one system, and that would undermine the rule of law and could have 
counter-transformative outcomes.115 
A helpful starting point or methodology for choosing between different 
sources of law that could apply to a constitutional dispute is presented by 
the subsidiarity principles developed by the Constitutional Court.116 These 
                                            
111  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 44 (emphasis added). 
112  Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA provides that the remedy of compensation is possible 
only in "exceptional cases". 
113  See the discussion in the main text surrounding fn 93 above. 
114  See the discussion in s 3.3 above. 
115  See the discussion in the next few paragraphs below. 
116  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35-39, 91-92. Van der Sijde Reconsidering 
the Relationship between Property and Regulation 200-201, by drawing on Quinot 
and Liebenberg 2011 Stell LR, describes instances where two constitutional rights 
(such as ss 25 and 33) are applicable to the same set of facts as "overlap" cases. 
Given the overlap that exists between expropriation law (s 25(2)) and administrative 
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principles derive from the eiusdem-generis principle, which entails that if 
both a specific law and a general law apply to the same point, parties must 
frame their arguments in terms of the specific law and may not rely on the 
general law.117 The purpose of these principles is to prevent parties from 
arbitrarily choosing the source of law that best suits their interests.118 This 
is to ensure, firstly, that in cases of competing legal sources the apparently 
applicable source demonstrates the desired or positive characteristics that 
the single-system-of-law principle requires of all law.119 The law,120 and 
specifically the applicable source, must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights and avoid negative features which subvert 
these values.121 Examples of negative features include laws that provide 
for arbitrary evictions, the weakening of already insecure tenure rights, 
and administrative injustice.122 Positive characteristics would be laws that 
clearly delineate the purposes for which property may be expropriated by 
way of administrative action, thus preventing situations where courts 
award compensation for materially defective administrative expropriations 
which – in turn – promote administrative injustice. Secondly, the 
subsidiarity principles avoid counter-transformative outcomes (in the form 
of the negative features mentioned) by preventing the creation of parallel 
legal systems.123 
                                                                                                                       
law (PAJA, read with s 33) in cases where property is expropriated by way of 
administrative action, it is imperative for courts to follow a methodology for deciding 
which field of law to apply and to explain this application with reference to the other 
applicable field. This will ensure that the law operates as a coherent system, thereby 
realising the positive characteristics envisioned by the single-system-of-law principle: 
see Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 
199-205.  
117  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35-43, citing inter alia Du Plessis Re-
interpretation of Statutes 234-236 and Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 2010 4 BCLR 312 (CC) para 50. 
118  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35-39. 
119  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 26-27, 40, 95-97.  
120  Which consists of various source of law. 
121  The same as fn 119 above. 
122  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 28-34. See further the discussion in s 3.3 
above. 
123  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 81-91, 111. Van der Walt (86-87) discusses 
Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
2007 6 SA 511 (SCA) as an example of where the Supreme Court of Appeal missed 
an opportunity to develop the common law in accordance with the second 
subsidiarity principle in that it preferred to craft a new constitutional remedy, which 
created parallel systems of law. Here the Court specifically created parallel sources 
of law by crafting a new constitutional remedy (based on the Constitution) without 
properly explaining why such a remedy is needed with reference to the common-law 
mandament van spolie. See similarly Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship 
between Property and Regulation 206. 
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The first subsidiarity principle entails that where a litigant claims limitation 
of a constitutional right, he or she must rely on legislation specifically 
enacted to protect that right and may not rely directly on the constitutional 
provision to protect the right.124 Litigants are therefore not free to choose 
the source of law that provides the best remedy; the first subsidiarity 
principle indicates which legal source should be applied. Yet it must be 
emphasised that the subsidiarity principles are not rigid rules that create a 
hierarchy between different constitutional rights – they merely provide a 
starting point or guidelines for adjudicating cases where two constitutional 
rights are at stake.125 
The first principle does not apply to property disputes (such as Arun) 
directly, since there is no single, comprehensive statute that has been 
enacted to give content to the whole property clause.126 Nevertheless, it 
applies indirectly to situations where legislation has been enacted to give 
effect to a non-property constitutional right, such as PAJA, for purposes of 
section 33.127 Although PAJA was enacted to give content to section 33 
and not section 25, it has been seen above that most expropriations (and 
probably the one in Arun as well) occur by way of administrative action. An 
expropriation that takes place via administrative action must comply with 
the principles of administrative justice, as set out by section 33 of the 
Constitution. Since PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33, it 
follows that in terms of the first subsidiarity principle litigants will be 
precluded from basing their cause of action directly on section 25(2) in 
disputes which concern administrative expropriations – they have to 
formulate their arguments in terms of PAJA. They will be permitted to rely 
directly on section 25(2) only if they wish to attack the constitutionality of 
PAJA for not adequately protecting their rights under section 25(2).128 
The eiusdem-generis principle and the first subsidiarity principle therefore 
provide convincing reasons why PAJA should have been considered more 
seriously in Arun. Indeed, the expropriation under section 28 of LUPO 
seems to have occurred by way of administrative action, which triggers the 
                                            
124  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36-43; Van der Walt 2008 CCR 100-103, 
citing South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 
(CC) paras 51-52; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) 
paras 39-40; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) paras 59 (Skweyiya J), 69 
(Ngcobo J). 
125  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 14-15, 105, citing Port Elizabeth Municipality 
v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
126  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 42-43. 
127  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 43-44. 
128  See the sources cited in fn 124 above. 
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first subsidiarity principle. Yet Moseneke DCJ preferred to decide the case 
solely under section 25(2), thereby creating parallel fields of law by 
arbitrarily awarding compensation for the (materially defective) 
expropriation under section 25(2) without explaining the reason for this 
choice with reference to administrative law. In this context the justice 
misconstrued the public interest and compensation requirements while 
refusing to apply the relevant legal field (namely PAJA) to establish 
whether the expropriation was lawful (or accorded with the legality 
principle in terms of the law-of-general-application requirement under 
section 25(2)). As mentioned earlier, a proper application of the 
substantive requirements in section 25(2), namely setting aside the 
expropriation for being ultra vires section 28 of LUPO, would have had a 
similar outcome to reviewing the decision that caused the expropriation 
under PAJA to have it set aside, thereby promoting administrative 
justice.129  
The dangers of not adhering to something like the subsidiarity principles 
are that courts – through arbitrarily choosing the source of law applicable 
to the case – could deliver judgments that have counter-constitutional and 
counter-transformative consequences while simultaneously undermining 
fundamental rights or legislation enacted to give content to those rights, 
such as PAJA.130 Indeed, these dangers seem to have been realised in 
Arun, where the Constitutional Court not only upheld an expropriation 
which clearly does not satisfy the section 25(2) requirements but also 
ignored PAJA, which directly applies to expropriations that occur by way of 
administrative action.131 Affording litigants a choice whether to claim 
compensation for expropriations that have material defects instead of 
reviewing them and setting them aside under PAJA (or simply declaring 
them invalid for being ultra vires the empowering statute) runs contrary to 
the values which the Bill of Rights seeks to achieve.132  
In the sections that follow we identify three factors that further strengthen 
our argument why administrative law should have played a more important 
role in Moseneke DCJ's judgment. These factors are the nature and 
                                            
129  See similarly Van der Walt Property and Constitution 45. 
130  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 26-28, 95-97. 
131  In terms of the first subsidiarity principle PAJA also applies directly to deprivations 
caused by administrative action: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 264-
270; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 
220-226. 
132  See the main text surrounding fn 122 above. 
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principles of administrative law, a green-light reading of internal remedies, 
and deference.  
4.3 The nature of administrative law  
The first consideration is the nature of administrative law. It is relevant 
because Moseneke DCJ seems to compartmentalise administrative law 
alongside other legal disciplines or fundamental rights as if it is a set of 
rules that does not apply in addition to those disciplines and does not 
inform those disciplines. Administrative law is concerned with "regulating 
the activities of bodies that exercise public powers or perform public 
functions".133 In this sense, the application of administrative law does not 
depend on other legal disciplines that happen to be relevant or applicable 
in a case but rather on the nature of the power or function. Hoexter 
explains, with reference to Baxter, that "administrative law is ubiquitous: it 
is a branch of the law that 'permeates virtually every facet of the legal 
system'. For instance, it applies to public procurement, all forms of 
licensing, town planning, expropriation".134 The examples in the list appear 
particularly apt in the circumstances of the Arun case. Indeed, one of the 
issues raised by this judgment is not so much whether administrative law, 
as opposed to expropriation law, should have been the applicable set of 
regulatory rules, but rather whether regulation (in the form of 
expropriation) itself should have been scrutinised. In other words, the 
Court should have considered how expropriation is regulated. 
Administrative law is also described as "the regulation of regulation".135 
Indeed, administrative law is not merely regulatory, it is supra-regulatory. 
Just as the right to equality is relevant in the application of other human 
rights disputes,136 whether expressly or implicitly, so is the right to just 
administrative action. The question whether regulation is consistent with 
the Constitution must take PAJA into consideration. 
The Constitutional Court has recognised the interdependence of all 
rights.137 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom138 it 
was held that the "Constitution entrenches both civil and political rights 
and social and economic rights. All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-
                                            
133  Hoexter Administrative Law 2 (emphasis in original). 
134  Hoexter Administrative Law 10 (fn omitted; emphasis added). 
135  With reference to Farina, see Hoexter Administrative Law 8 (fn omitted). 
136  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 
83; Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 51 et seq. 
137  Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 51 et seq. 
138  2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
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related and mutually supporting".139 The Court also emphasised the 
importance of the interrelated nature of rights: 
[t]he proposition that rights are interrelated and are all equally important is 
not merely a theoretical postulate. The concept has immense human and 
practical significance in a society founded on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.140 
The interpretation of section 28 of LUPO and section 25(2) of the 
Constitution was decisive in Arun. However, in this decision the 
Constitutional Court does not seem to follow the approach the Court itself 
formulated, namely that all rights must be construed in their context.141 
The same applies to the non-application of the subsidiarity principles 
developed by the Court.142 What is reasonable in terms of one right will 
depend on the content of other rights. Is the right to just administrative 
action not a component of the interpretive context for expropriation? 
Administrative law is not confined to the application of PAJA; 
administrative law provides an approach to legal problem solving and the 
principles of administrative justice inform other rights and the law 
generally. Thus, reference to administrative law can provide more to legal 
problem-solving than determining whether there is an administrative action 
and whether a ground of review succeeds on the facts. We elaborate on 
this point under the section on green-light theory and deference. 
4.4 Principles of administrative law 
In MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & 
Lazer Institute143 (Kirland) the Constitutional Court recently emphasised 
the importance of procedural constraints to judicial review in emphatic 
fashion: 
PAJA requires that the government respondents should have applied to set 
aside the approval, by way of formal counter-application. They must do the 
same even if PAJA does not apply. To demand this of government is not to 
stymie it by forcing upon it a senseless formality. It is to insist on due 
                                            
139  Grootboom para 23. 
140  Grootboom para 83. Compare Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
1 SA 217 (CC) paras 8-23, 37. 
141  Grootboom para 21: "[i]nterpreting a right in its context requires the consideration of 
two types of context. On the one hand, rights must be understood in their textual 
setting. This will require a consideration of Chapter 2 and the Constitution as a 
whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood in their social and 
historical context" (emphasis added). See similarly Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 8-23, 37. 
142  See the discussion in s 4.2 above. 
143  2014 3 SA 481 (CC). 
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process[.] 
Counsel for the Department told this Court ... that, if the Department had to 
bring a counter-application under PAJA, it would face the PAJA 180-day 
rule. Well, precisely ... This Court recently confirmed in Khumalo that 
litigants, including public functionaries, are bound by statutory and common-
law time limits and may not circumvent them using procedural tricks. The 
same is true here.144 
This dictum was written by Cameron J, who delivered the majority 
judgment in this case. Interestingly, Cameron J and the three justices145 
who agreed with him in Kirland endorsed Moseneke DCJ's ruling in Arun. 
As seen from the quote above, the Kirland court decided that the 180-day 
rule cannot be circumvented. Nevertheless, in Arun a unanimous 
Constitutional Court ruled that the expiry of the 180-day period is a factor 
contributing to its ruling not to review the decision that led to the 
expropriation of excess land. According to Kirland one cannot avoid 
relying on PAJA simply because the period for bringing an application for 
review has expired. However, in Arun the Court seemed to adopt a 
different approach. It follows that the Arun court avoided administrative law 
for reasons that are unclear at best and that seem to contradict its 
decision in Kirland.  
Still, the principles of administrative law seem to feature throughout Arun 
without being named. One notes the reference to internal remedies, which 
is reminiscent of section 7(2) of PAJA. Moseneke DCJ briefly refers to 
arbitrariness under section 25(1) of the Constitution, which relates to 
rationality or reasonableness generally under PAJA.146 The Court 
discusses the purpose for the vesting of land in the local authority in terms 
of section 28 of LUPO, which can be linked to lawfulness (section 
6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA) and to reasonableness (section 6(2)(h) of PAJA). Then 
there is the centrality of the interpretation of section 28 of LUPO to the 
outcome of the case; its importance relates to the question whether or not 
the provision authorises expropriation of excess land without 
compensation. This matter is perhaps the most obvious administrative-law 
question, namely lawfulness, and yet the court mentions neither 
lawfulness nor the principle of legality. 
                                            
144  Kirland paras 82-83 (fns omitted; emphasis added). 
145  Froneman J, Nkabinde J and Moseneke ACJ (as he then was). 
146  Ss 6(2)(f)(ii) and 6(2)(h) of PAJA respectively. See similarly Van der Sijde 
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Property and Regulation 236-243 
EJ MARAIS & PJH MAREE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)   32 
 
PAJA is applicable to administrative action only, and therefore the point of 
departure is determining if there is an administrative action. However, the 
presence of an administrative action is not decisive – a decision may be 
unreviewable because of the possibility of internal remedies or because 
the application was brought too late.147 The Court seems to argue that 
PAJA should not be applied because "the developer will have to confront a 
legion of obstacles".148 The Court's choice of words is dramatic. The legion 
of obstacles in actual fact consists of only three obstacles, which the Court 
itself lists. In addition, the obstacles are all required by law. Thus, the legal 
relevance of characterising these requirements as "obstacles" is 
questionable. The Court held the appellant would have to "conjure up" 
discrete PAJA review grounds. The appellant does not have to conjure up 
grounds of review, since all possible grounds are listed in section 6 of the 
Act. In any event, why is this relevant? If the law requires a litigant to 
follow certain steps in order to succeed with an application, then surely 
that is the end of the matter.149 Cameron J's response to such an 
argument in Kirland, which is quoted above, strengthens this argument. 
Moseneke DCJ's wording in the paragraph where he dismisses the need 
to apply administrative law strongly suggests that the reason why he did 
not entertain the question "should we apply administrative law?" was 
because it would have been onerous to the appellant. He also mentions 
that it is not clear that there is an administrative action on the facts. 
Whether or not there is an administrative action on the facts is a question 
the Court should address. If the Court then finds that there is not an 
administrative action, the reason for not subjecting the decision to judicial 
review is the absence of an administrative action. In Arun the Court 
appears to side-step this inquiry on the basis that the presence of an 
administrative action is uncertain. This is not a justification for avoiding 
administrative law. Is it in any event ever certain that there is an 
administrative action before argument on the point is made? Even if one 
were to assume that there is no administrative action, the state's exercise 
of public power would always remain subject to the constitutional principle 
                                            
147  Section 7(2)(a) provides that a court may not review an administrative action unless 
internal remedies have first been exhausted; s 7(1) of PAJA provides that an 
application for review "must be instituted without unreasonable delay" and within 180 
days.  
148  Arun (CC) para 66. 
149  See similarly Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and 
Regulation 202-203. 
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of legality.150 At the very least, the legality principle requires proper 
authorisation when public power is exercised.151 Thus, the absence of an 
administrative action does not excuse the Court from assessing the 
legality of the purported expropriation. 
On the facts, the following decisions could potentially qualify as 
administrative action: (i) the granting of the subdivision application under 
section 25 of LUPO, which resulted in the vesting of excess land in the 
local authority under section 28; (ii) the decision to expropriate;152 (iii) the 
decision not to pay compensation; (iv) the decision that certain portions of 
land were or were not in excess of the normal need of the planned 
development; and, finally, the decision that compensation is not the 
appropriate relief for Arun. The Court in certain parts of the judgment 
suggests that expropriation is possible without a decision that qualifies as 
administrative action.153 In other words, on the Court's understanding of 
the facts, excess land is expropriated in the absence of a decision 
protected by PAJA or the legality principle. Yet the vesting of excess land 
in the local authority in actual fact seems to have been caused by 
administrative action, as shown above.154 
4.5 Green-light theory and deference 
4.5.1 Backdrop 
Other factors that could assist in determining whether administrative law 
should be considered are green-light theory and deference. Green-light 
theory and deference are discussed below and their relevance to cases 
such as Arun is set out. 
                                            
150  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 59. 
151  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) paras 59, 85; Hoexter Administrative Law 121 et seq. 
See similarly the discussion of the law-of-general-application requirement in s 25(2), 
which is discussed in s 3.1 above. 
152  The Court assumes that the approval of the rezoning automatically led to the 
expropriation of excess land, which means the decision to expropriate is linked to the 
decision to approve the subdivision.  
153  See the discussion in s 3.2 above. See similarly Van der Walt 2014 ASSL. 
154  See s 3.2 above. See similarly Van der Walt 2014 ASSL. 
EJ MARAIS & PJH MAREE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)   34 
 
4.5.2 A green-light reading of internal remedies155 
Section 7(2)(a) of PAJA provides that no court or tribunal shall review an 
administrative action in terms of the Act unless any internal remedy 
provided for in any other law has first been exhausted. Thus, the 
exhaustion of internal remedies is a precondition for access to judicial 
review under PAJA. In other words, courts should normally turn away a 
litigant who has not availed him- or herself of internal remedies.156 The use 
of the word "any" and the fact that there are no qualifiers for the nature of 
the internal remedy imply that any remedy will suffice, irrespective of 
whether it is mandatory or voluntary. Where a court is not satisfied that all 
internal remedies have been exhausted, it must direct the litigant to first 
exhaust such remedies before instituting proceedings for judicial review 
under PAJA.157 Although this limits the right of access to courts,158 it 
seems to comply with the limitations clause.159 Indeed, section 7(2)(c) 
stipulates that a court may, in exceptional circumstances and on 
application by an applicant, exempt the applicant from the obligation to 
exhaust any internal remedy if the interest of justice requires it.160 Thus, 
courts retain a discretionary power to override section 7(2)(a). 
Unfortunately, section 7(2)(a) does not inform the Court's consideration of 
internal remedies in Arun. 
Green-light theory sheds light on the nature of these provisions in PAJA. 
Harlow and Rawlings161 identify two schools of thought regarding the 
control of state power, namely red-light theory and green-light theory. Red-
light theory conceptualises administrative law as a form of control of state 
power and the judiciary as being responsible for implementing this 
control.162 The rule of law and judicial control are central. Green-light 
theory regards administrative law as "a vehicle for political progress and 
welcomes the 'administrative state'".163 Both theories are concerned with 
                                            
155  In this section an analysis of green-light theory and internal remedies, first 
canvassed by Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System chs 3, 
6, is applied to Arun (CC). 
156  Evidently, this provision implicates the right to access to courts. Arguably, access is 
not denied but delayed. 
157  Section 7(2)(b) of PAJA. 
158  Section 34 of the Constitution. 
159  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. See Hoexter Administrative Law 538-543, 593. 
160  Section 7(2)(c) of PAJA. 
161  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration ch 1. Also see Maree Investigating an 
Alternative Administrative-Law System 66 et seq. 
162  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration 23; Hoexter Administrative Law 139. 
163  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration 31. 
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the control of state power but where "[r]ed light theory prioritises courts ... 
green light theory prefers democratic or political forms of accountability".164 
The red-light and green-light theories are distinguished by the source and 
nature of control. 
In terms of green-light theory, courts intervene less and support the 
executive in the implementation of policy.165 Thus, the courts are involved, 
although their role is dependent on the roles assumed by other state 
institutions. Green-light theorists prefer internal controls for the 
administration as opposed to traditional judicial control, which is 
external.166 Internal controls are potentially a more prospective form of 
control, as opposed to the external and retrospective control of judicial 
review.167 Therefore, green-light theory can be seen as a response to the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma. 
When section 7(2) of PAJA is viewed in terms of the green-light theory, the 
(potential) nature of the provision comes into focus. Firstly, it provides the 
authorised decision-maker, typically a member of the executive or 
administration, an opportunity to rectify its own errors or address the 
dispute. Secondly, it discourages unnecessary litigation, thereby saving 
time and financial costs. It also reduces the case load and increases the 
likelihood of a speedy resolution. Thirdly, it may give a body with 
specialised expertise in a particular field the opportunity to resolve the 
dispute. Fourthly, if the internal process allows for an appeal, the 
protection offered by the administrative tribunal or committee may in fact 
allow for more protection than the courts can provide under judicial review. 
Against this backdrop Froneman DJP's (as he then was) authoritative 
distinction between appeal and review in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus168 
should be kept in mind: 
[i]n determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the 
reasons given for it, value judgments will have to be made which will, almost 
inevitably, involve the consideration of the 'merits' of the matter in some way 
or another. As long as the Judge determining this issue is aware that he or 
she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the 
                                            
164  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration 38. 
165  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration 140. 
166  Hoexter Administrative Law 141. 
167  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration 40; Hoexter Administrative Law 141 fn 
184. 
168  1999 3 SA 304 (LAC). 
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correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally 
justifiable, the process will be in order.169 
Therefore, in appeal proceedings a tribunal has greater powers than in the 
review context; an appeal allows the tribunal to consider the merits in 
order to replace the original decision. This is not possible under review. 
Thus, in principle, appeal proceedings have the potential to offer greater 
protection to an aggrieved party. Section 44 of LUPO provides for such an 
appeal, but since Moseneke DCJ found that expropriation occurred by 
operation of law, the vesting of land in terms of section 28 of LUPO was 
not open to appeal. 
In addition, section 8 of PAJA provides that a  
court, in proceedings for judicial review … may grant any order that is just 
and equitable, including orders … 
(c) setting aside the administrative action and … 
(ii) in exceptional cases –  
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting 
a defect resulting from the administrative action; or 
(bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the 
proceedings to pay compensation. 
Thus, only in exceptional circumstances will a court be able to replace or 
correct a decision or order the payment of compensation.170 In Gauteng 
Gambling Board v Silverstar Development Ltd171 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that "remittal is almost always the prudent and proper 
course".172 Yet compensation is the remedy awarded by the Court in Arun, 
but on a different basis. The Court could have awarded compensation on 
the grounds that the case had been pending for a number of years and 
that it was in the interests of justice to award compensation, rather than 
under section 25(2) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, Moseneke DCJ 
awarded compensation to Arun based on section 25(2) and not section 
8(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA. However, an internal appeal process can replace the 
decision as a matter of course. Denying the administration the opportunity 
to rectify its own mistakes could have the effect of preventing the 
administration from improving on its decisions, decision-making processes 
                                            
169  Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) para 36. 
170  The default remedy is setting aside and remittal: see Hoexter Administrative Law 
552; Bleazard and Budlender "Remedies in Judicial Review Proceedings" 251-253. 
171  2005 4 SA 67 (SCA). 
172  Gauteng Gambling Board v Silverstar Development Ltd 2005 4 SA 67 (SCA) para 
29.  
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and dispute resolution.173 This is an essential development; after all, the 
vast majority of disputes or complaints never reach the courts. The 
transformation of dispute resolution is very much in the hands of the 
administration. 
Fifthly, allowing the authorised decision-maker to rectify its mistake, 
amend its decision, or to explain itself is inherently democratic, in a 
majoritarian sense. The section 7(2)(a) requirement respects the 
separation of powers and can also be regarded as a form of deference. 
The Court asks: "[w]as Arun obliged to make use of an appeal or review 
process before instituting a claim for compensation?" However, section 
7(2)(a) suggests that this is not the better question. The question could 
have been posed differently, namely was there an appeal process that 
could have shed light on the relevant issues? Green-light theory and 
deference support such an approach. After all, section 28 of LUPO does 
not operate in a vacuum, but the Court's decision pivots on the 
interpretation of the provision in a narrow context (namely section 25(2)) 
without considering the provisions in PAJA discussed above.  
4.5.3 Dyzenhaus: deference as respect174 
Deference has enjoyed increasing attention since the appearance of 
Hoexter's seminal article entitled "The Future of Judicial Review in South 
African Administrative Law".175 An exposition of the general theory of 
deference or of the content of deference as understood by our courts is 
not provided here, however. It suffices to mention that the Constitutional 
Court has established deference as a legal principle in South African law 
and that it remains a prominent topic.176 
Still, it is necessary to discuss Dyzenhaus's understanding of deference as 
respect. The reason for this discussion is not merely theoretical, as both 
Hoexter and O'Regan J draw on Dyzenhaus. Hoexter refers to Dyzenhaus 
in her article on judicial review,177 in which she does not attempt to define 
deference. She refers to "the sort of deference we should be aspiring 
                                            
173  This undermines the realisation of administrative justice, which is one of the positive 
characteristics that the legal system – as a single system of law – should promote: 
see Van der Walt Property and Constitution 28-34 and the discussion of the 
subsidiarity principles in s 4.2 above. 
174  In this section an analysis of deference, first canvassed in Maree Investigating an 
Alternative Administrative-Law System chs 3 and 6, is applied to Arun (CC). 
175  Hoexter 2000 SALJ. 
176  Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System 75-98. 
177  Hoexter 2000 SALJ. 484-519. Also see Hoexter Administrative Law 151 fn 245. 
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to",178 adding that "we may perhaps take inspiration from Dyzenhaus's 
exploration of the idea of deference".179 Nevertheless, in Logbro 
Properties CC v Bedderson,180 the first case to take judicial notice of 
Hoexter's notion of deference, deference is defined precisely as Hoexter 
tentatively described the "sort of deference" she had in mind. O'Regan J, 
in turn, refers to Dyzenhaus in Bato Star.181 Although she relies largely on 
Hoexter's understanding of deference, she does distinguish between 
deference as respect and deference as submission. It follows that 
Dyzenhaus is a source of inspiration in the development of a South African 
theory of deference. 
The reading of Dyzenhaus presented here explores another dimension to 
deference that has not been adopted by South African courts. Dyzenhaus 
poses the following questions and his conception of "deference as 
respect" is his response to them:  
[h]ow should judges in common law jurisdictions respond to administrative 
determinations of the law? Should they defer to such determinations or 
evaluate them in accordance with their sense of what the right determination 
should have been?182  
Dyzenhaus points out that these questions cannot be answered without 
considering political and legal theory183 and he criticises formalistic 
arguments that justify judicial review, such as the ultra vires or common-
law justifications. Dyzenhaus is sceptical of these arguments because they 
do not acknowledge the legitimate role of the public administration in the 
state.184  
Deference as respect introduces a new methodology to judicial decision-
making by modifying the courts' approach to legal argumentation: 
Deference as respect requires not submission but a respectful attention to 
the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision, 
whether that decision be the statutory decision of the legislature, a judgment 
of another court, or the decision of an administrative agency.185 
                                            
178  Hoexter 2000 SALJ 501 (emphasis added). 
179  Hoexter 2000 SALJ 501 fn 79 (emphasis added). Also see Maree Investigating an 
Alternative Administrative-Law System 77 et seq. 
180  2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
181  Bato Star para 46 fn 32.  
182  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 279. 
183  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 279. 
184  De Ville 2006 PELJ 42-43.  
185  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 286. 
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When a court compartmentalises individual rights, as is seemingly the 
case in Arun, the "reasons offered or which could be offered" are curtailed. 
Thus, the right a court chooses to apply changes not only the type of legal 
argument but also the nature of concepts such as reasonableness and the 
implications for internal remedies. 
The question remains: what does respect entail? The potential effect of 
deference as respect is far-reaching and fundamental: 
[d]eference as respect ... provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to 
rearticulate the relationships between the legislature, the courts and the 
administration in such a way that the courts retain a legitimate role as the 
ultimate authority on the interpretation of law. 
In statutory interpretation, this ideal requires of judges that they determine 
the intention of the statute, not in accordance with the idea that there is 
some prior (positivistic) fact of the matter, but in terms of the reasons that 
best justify having that statute.186 
Deference can influence the manner in which the branches of the state 
interact and the manner in which meaning is given to legal texts. South 
Africa has adopted a legal system of constitutional supremacy,187 founded 
on human dignity, equality, freedom and democratic principles. The 
Constitution drives transformation and the administration has a critical role 
to play in this endeavour.188 In such a system the Bill of Rights as a whole, 
inter alia, must constitute "the reasons that best justify having [a] 
statute".189 Such an approach could have provided a richer template for 
the interpretation of section 28 of LUPO.190 Moseneke DCJ mentions that 
the relevant legislation must be interpreted in line with section 25(2), yet 
he fails to say anything about whether it should be read in line with section 
33 of the Constitution and PAJA. 
Deference as conceptualised by Dyzenhaus involves all the branches of 
state, not only the judiciary and the administration. Deference requires that 
judges participate actively in the justification of state action. The courts set 
out the best reasoning that resulted in a statute and where the 
interpretation of legislation is contested this process will contribute to 
                                            
186  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
187  Sections 1(d), 2 of the Constitution. 
188  Sections 7, 8, 195, 197(1) of the Constitution. 
189  See similarly Van der Walt Property and Constitution 26-27, 95-97. 
190  The first subsidiarity principle supports a similar approach for adjudicating disputes 
where ss 25 and 33 of the Constitution are at play: see the discussion in s 4.2 
above. 
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giving meaning to the legislative provisions.191 Thus, where a court can 
consider an administrative tribunal's reasoning, the "interpretative context" 
is expanded as a result of this approach.192 
In other words, courts should treat a tribunal's reasoning with respect, 
even when the reasoning is not legal, by asking "whether that reasoning 
did in fact and also could in principle justify the conclusion reached".193 Not 
applying administrative law, as done by the Court in Arun, decreases the 
number of relevant arguments and factors which could be taken into 
consideration, such as the appellant's choice not to make use of internal 
remedies, the lawfulness of the expropriation or the appropriateness of 
compensation as a remedy.194 
The justifications for assuming this "attitude" to judicial decision-making 
have been developed by a number of authors such as Dyzenhaus, Mullan, 
and (more recently) Daly. The justifications include the legislature's 
decision to appoint the tribunal as the primary forum for dispute resolution, 
the speed and economy with which it can dispose of matters relative to the 
courts, and its expertise in a particular field.195 This approach is not simply 
derived from the separation of powers. Deference is also justified by 
democratic principles.196 
Thus, the core of deference is that courts must take administrative 
decisions seriously.197 However, deference as developed by Dyzenhaus is 
not how the concept is explained and applied in Bato Star.198 Firstly, 
according to Dyzenhaus, courts should give "independent weight" to the 
reasoning of administrative decision-makers.199 Secondly, the recognition 
of administrative determinations does not exclude "close judicial scrutiny 
                                            
191  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
192  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
193  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 304 (emphasis added). 
194  Compare Marais 2016 SALJ s III(c). 
195  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303-304. Also see Daly Theory of Deference ch 2 
on the central importance of the "declared constitutional principle" of "legislative 
intent" and ch 3 on the "practical justifications for curial deference", such as 
expertise and complexity. 
196  The "principle" of deference as respect "is inherently democratic. It adopts the 
assumption that what justifies all public power is the ability of its incumbents to offer 
adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject to them. The 
difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the democratic right of the 
latter to require an accounting for acts of public power." (Dyzenhaus "Politics of 
Deference" 305.) 
197  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
198  Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System 114 et seq. 
199  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 302. 
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of the tribunal's reasoning".200 Thirdly, close scrutiny results in the 
"paradox of rationality"; however, according to Dyzenhaus, close scrutiny 
and deference are compatible.201 Finally, deference as respect changes 
the "interpretive context",202 which has significant implications for judicial 
decision-making.203 Interpreting statutes and administrative determinations 
of the law thus amounts to a "reconstructive project" and the reasoning 
may be "legislative, administrative or judicial".204 
Where the administration is concerned, courts must determine whether a 
decision is "supportable by the reasons it [the administrative tribunal] in 
fact and could in principle have offered"205 and "even if the reasons in fact 
given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the court must 
first seek to supplement them before it seeks to subvert them".206 
Therefore, where a court assesses the regularity of administrative 
decisions, that court must perform an additional, constructive function in 
determining whether the decisions are supportable or justifiable, without 
compromising close judicial scrutiny. Thus, judges play a proactive role in 
adjudication. 
In Arun a number of public considerations were at stake: the protection of 
ownership; the obligations associated with maintaining a transport 
network; the duty to avoid unnecessary or wasteful expenditure (section 
195 of the Constitution); the dual nature of administrative law;207 the 
nature of administrative justice; and constitutional and legislative 
                                            
200  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 302.  
201  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 302-303. This suggests that deference is not 
limited to determining the intensity of review (compare Daly Theory of Deference ch 
4), nor does close scrutiny of the facts exclude deference as understood by 
Dyzenhaus. 
202  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
203  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303-304. Taking administrative determinations 
seriously, in the sense advocated by Dyzenhaus, reinforces both the red-light and 
the green-light theories of administrative law. On the one hand, administrative acts 
are scrutinised closely and the administration is required to justify its acts. This can 
be characterised as a form of control. On the other hand, the administration, as the 
branch specialised in administrative matters, is entitled to justify its actions with 
reference to the reasons that best justify the decision, even if those reasons are 
administrative or other reasons. 
204  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303.  
205  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 305. Dyzenhaus reiterates this point: in the event 
of recourse to a court "that recourse must be on the basis of the question whether 
the tribunal's decision was supportable by the reasons it in fact and could in principle 
have offered". Also see De Ville 2006 PELJ 53 ("Asking whether a decision is 
justifiable is also different from asking whether a decision is justified."). 
206  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 304 (emphasis added). 
207  Maree "Administrative Authorities in Legal Context" 58-59. 
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interpretation. Administrative law rules enable the courts to hear 
arguments on all of these issues and to weigh them against one another. 
Had Moseneke DCJ asked for the parties to present argument on the 
judicial review of the decision on the basis of lawfulness or 
reasonableness he might very well have ordered the appellant to first 
exhaust its internal remedies under PAJA instead of awarding 
compensation for the (apparent) expropriation of excess land. This is in 
line with Dyzenhaus's conception of deference as respect. The judicial act 
of providing the platform for such argument could be regarded as a form of 
judicial respect, regardless of the outcome of the case. Deference as 
respect is not limited to administrative action. If South African courts 
endorse deference in the form suggested by Dyzenhaus, then the 
executive's reasoning must not only be taken seriously, courts must seek 
to supplement the executive's reasoning. One form of supplementing or 
expanding the "interpretive context"208 is the opportunity to consider an 
administrative tribunal's findings. 
5 Conclusion  
This article analyses the Arun judgment from two perspectives, namely 
expropriation law and administrative law. It highlights the difficulties when 
courts are faced with cases where more than one fundamental right is 
implicated – here the right to receive compensation for expropriation under 
section 25(2) and the right to administrative justice under section 33, read 
with PAJA. Moseneke DCJ ruled that Arun must be compensated for the 
expropriation of excess land if section 28 of LUPO is to comply with 
section 25(2) of the Constitution. Unfortunately, this outcome is 
problematic in terms of both section 25(2) and PAJA. 
The decision is unattractive from a section 25(2) perspective for four 
reasons. Firstly, it misconstrues the role of the public interest requirement 
for expropriation when understood in terms of the law-of-general-
application requirement, as informed by the legality principle. The state 
may expropriate property only for purposes permitted by an authorising 
statute. Yet Moseneke DCJ acknowledged that section 28 of LUPO does 
not permit the expropriation of excess land for the purpose of aiding the 
construction of higher-order roads. It follows that the attempted 
expropriation is ultra vires the empowering legislation and should thus 
have been set aside, since the state cannot use the power to expropriate 
                                            
208  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
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property for purposes other than those permitted by the empowering 
legislation. However, the Court preferred to "save" section 28 by awarding 
compensation to Arun. This finding, in turn, disregards the function of 
compensation in expropriation law, namely that it is merely a consequence 
of a valid expropriation and not a justification for it. Thirdly, the Arun court 
placed too much emphasis on the effect of the property limitation to decide 
the expropriation question. This approach is erroneous because it 
oversimplifies the distinction between deprivation and expropriation. 
Finally, awarding compensation for the invalid expropriation under section 
28 seems to afford litigants an election whether to uphold a materially 
defective administrative expropriation against payment of compensation or 
to have it reviewed under PAJA to have it set aside. Such an approach 
holds negative repercussions for the single-system-of-law principle 
because it creates parallel fields of law, which has the potential of 
undermining the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
From an administrative law perspective we identify four considerations that 
indicate why PAJA should have played a more prominent role in 
Moseneke DCJ's judgment. The first is the internal coherency of the law in 
view of the subsidiarity principles. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers it was 
held that we have a single system of law – all law derives its force from the 
Constitution. Against this background the Constitutional Court developed a 
number of subsidiarity principles that provide a methodology when 
ascertaining which source of law should be applied to a dispute in cases 
where more than one fundamental right is applicable. The rationale behind 
these principles is to ensure that the law exhibits the positive 
characteristics which support the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights, such as ensuring that administrative expropriations take place only 
for purposes authorised by the empowering statute, which promotes 
administrative justice. The fact that Moseneke DCJ preferred to uphold an 
invalid expropriation by awarding compensation amounts to condoning an 
unlawful administrative act aimed at realising a purpose which is not 
sanctioned by the empowering legislation. This, in turn, runs contrary to 
both section 25(2) and the right to just administrative action under section 
33. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court's refusal to follow PAJA in Arun by 
reason of it being onerous on the appellant contradicts its earlier case law, 
where it held that time-periods under the Act cannot be circumvented by 
reason of them being burdensome. The rationale behind these time-
periods is integral to securing administrative justice, since time-periods are 
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not merely formalistic technicalities. Time periods prevent unnecessary 
delays and enable courts to hear matters before too much time has 
passed,209 which (in turn) promotes legal certainty. In addition, section 7(1) 
of PAJA contains a rule against unreasonable delay, in addition to the 
180-day rule. 
Thirdly, we argue that a green-light approach to internal remedies could 
have resulted in the broadening of the interpretative context and the 
recognition of the legitimate role of the public administration in the state. 
The Court's approach in finding that excess land vests in the local 
authority ex lege does not take into consideration the significance of 
internal remedies and its approach leads to the finding that section 44 of 
LUPO does not provide for an internal appeal of decisions flowing from 
section 28 of the Ordinance. By failing to seriously consider the legitimate 
role of the administration in the state and the administration's interpretation 
of law, internal and more democratic forms of control are undermined.210 
As stated above, the Court considers whether the internal appeal or 
review process is mandatory. However, green-light theory and section 
7(2)(a) of PAJA suggest that the role that internal appeals could play 
should form part of the Court's interpretive approach, rather than merely 
focussing on the provisions of LUPO in isolation. In other words, the 
legitimate role of the administration and the role of internal processes 
should be assessed in the light of South Africa's human rights culture211 
and not in a vacuum. 
Finally, deference as understood by Dyzenhaus also exemplifies why 
administrative law should not be ignored in cases which concern the 
exercise of public power. Administrative law regulates the relationship 
between the executive and the administration, of which deference is a 
definitive component in the South African context.212 The core of 
deference as understood by Dyzenhaus is that courts must take 
administrative decisions and determinations of the law seriously.213 One 
way of achieving this is by affording the administration an opportunity to 
rectify its errors. If the matter remains unresolved, courts will have the 
benefit of being able to consider the administrative decision-maker's 
reasons. In Arun the Court neither affords the administration this 
                                            
209  This facilitates access to evidence and the reliability of oral testimony. 
210  Hoexter Administrative Law 141. 
211  Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 23-41. 
212  Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System.  
213  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
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opportunity nor regards the appellant's failure to make use of internal 
procedures as problematic. 
Deference also requires courts to actively participate in the justification of 
administrative decisions by asking whether the administration's "reasoning 
did in fact and also could in principle justify the conclusion reached".214 As 
with green-light theory, deference as respect changes the "interpretive 
context".215 Such an approach to the scrutiny of administrative decisions is 
far-reaching: "even if the reasons in fact given do not seem wholly 
adequate to support the decision, the court must first seek to supplement 
them before it seeks to subvert them".216 This approach does not threaten 
a court's role, because deference as respect does not exclude "close 
judicial scrutiny of the tribunal's reasoning".217 In Arun, however, the 
Constitutional Court construes section 28 of LUPO by means of a narrow, 
textual approach to interpretation.218 By choosing not to engage with the 
implications of administrative justice, the court side-steps critical 
constitutional debates on the separation of powers, on constitutional 
supremacy and the single-system-of-law principle, and on the relationship 
between the administration and judiciary in a democratic state as well as 
administrative law and expropriation law. Ironically, Moseneke DCJ 
introduces his judgment with the following sentence: "[t]his appeal raises a 
significant constitutional issue connected to the expropriation of land and 
compensation".219 Regrettably, he does not seem to appreciate the 
significance of the constitutional issue, opting instead to resolve the 
question solely on the basis of section 25(2).  
It remains to be seen how Moseneke DCJ's judgment will impact future 
planning law disputes similar to Arun. The Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA), which came into effect on 1 July 
2015, applies nationally, and although it does not directly repeal planning 
laws like LUPO, it stipulates that  
no legislation not repealed by this Act [such as LUPO] may prescribe an 
alternative or parallel mechanism, measure, institution or system on spatial 
planning, land use, land use management and land development in a manner 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 
                                            
214  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 304 (emphasis added). 
215  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 303. 
216  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 304 (emphasis added). 
217  Dyzenhaus "Politics of Deference" 302.  
218  See similarly Marais 2016 SALJ s III(c). 
219  Arun (CC) para 1. 
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SPLUMA does not contain a provision similar to section 28 of LUPO,220 
which means it is therefore unlikely that a case such as Arun would be 
brought under this Act.221 Yet section 37(2) of the Western Cape Land Use 
Planning Act 3 of 2014 (LUPA)222 provides that  
[a] municipality is not liable for compensation for the land [earmarked for a 
public place] if the provision of the public place is based on the normal need 
therefor arising from the subdivision. 
This provision is strikingly similar to section 28 of LUPO, especially since 
the definition of "public place" in LUPA includes streets and roads.223 It will 
therefore be interesting to see whether the Constitutional Court will apply 
its (flawed) approach towards section 28 to disputes under section 37(2) of 
LUPA and whether it will perhaps reconsider its ruling in view of the 
criticism raised in this contribution as well as by various other authors.224 
Until clarity is obtained, Western Cape municipalities had best be prudent 
when they indicate the amount of land required for public roads when 
approving development plans under LUPA, as a developer will be entitled 
to receive compensation (in terms of section 26(1) of the Expropriation 
Act) for any land that vests in the local authority and which is in excess of 
the normal need of the proposed development. 
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